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AbsTrAcT
An independent state must have its own army. If we don’t defend ourselves, 
someone else will come and defend us. The conflicts in the border areas of the 
collapsing Soviet Union and the Balkans in the 1990s as well as the unstable situ-
ation in Estonia and neighbouring countries underlined the need for the quick 
establishment of Estonia’s own army. At the time the state’s independence was 
restored, there were no people in Estonia who knew Western weaponry or how 
to carry out weapons procurements. The only things left behind by the Russian 
army were old gas masks, helmets, fuel and lubricants, a number of buildings and 
a polluted environment.
The West did provide military assistance to Estonia from 1993–1996, but 
no weapons were given to us. Estonia received old equipment, uniforms and 
vehicles from Germany, Sweden, Finland, the US, Denmark and other countries, 
which also included things that had belonged to the liquidated East-German 
army. Estonia received a couple of L-410 jets, some helicopters and ships from 
the ‘bankruptcy estate’ of the latter. Hand guns, Kalashnikov rifles, ammunition 
etc. were bought from Romania and China. In 1993, Estonia managed to enter 
into a contract for purchasing weapons from the Israeli company IMI-TAAS. 
The defence budget comprised ca 4–5% of the state budget from 1993–2000. In 
1996 the Estonian parliament set NATO membership as the state’s goal. Esto-
nia participated actively in partnership programmes. From 1996/1997, Estonia 
finally started receiving aid with weapons from the West, which in addition to 
handguns included artillery guns, mortars, ships etc. This aid was important, as 
the state was poor. The first major procurements for weapons after the Israeli 
weapons deal were carried out at the start of the 21st century.
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1. Fragile freedom and the invention  
of the national defence
The will to protect itself is one of the main features of a real state. The few 
exceptions there are call for special conditions. However, the threats of 
1992 were very real for Estonia. A number of bloody civil wars and border 
conflicts broke out at the edges of the Soviet Union after its collapse in 1991 
as well as in Yugoslavia, reaching their culmination in 1992: Moldova, the 
Caucasus, Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia and others were affected. The Russian 
Army, which was critically strong for Estonia, was still here in 1992 and 
the coup d’etat that occurred in Moscow a year before, the march of the 
Pskov troops to Tallinn and the anti-Estonian movement were a reality. 
The events of 1993 in Moscow were still in the future. Which prophet 
could have promised a separate paradise for the Baltic States?
A war waged by all of Russia against Estonia was not the most imme-
diate threat. Local instability in and around our state was a much bigger 
problem. Estonia’s almost non-existent armed forces couldn’t have pro-
tected the state even against the invasion of a separate military unit by 
our neighbour and/or a conflict ignited within Estonia. Strengthening 
our self-defence wasn’t the issue here – we had to create it from scratch.
If we don’t defend ourselves, someone else will come and defend us. 
But how will we do it, and with what? We didn’t have any of the important 
things we needed at first. We had the knowledge and practical skills for 
advancement in other areas of life, even if we had inherited them from the 
previous society – e.g. schools, hospitals, libraries, police, manufacturing – 
and the people working there were qualified professionals who had the 
equipment they needed. However, we had almost no idea or knowledge of 
armament. There were almost no people with the necessary battle experi-
ence and knowledge in Estonia’s national defence organisation, and nei-
ther did we have any arms or the immediate military support of the West.
We had to create the defence of our state. Since we hardly had any-
thing, making a list of the things we needed was not difficult. However, 
we had no answers to the questions concerning their use, quality require-
ments, or staffing and maintenance. In the first years, Estonia didn’t just 
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lack experienced officials for dealings with the West, but we also had no 
people with knowledge of Western military equipment or how to procure 
it. Even an adequate command of the English language wasn’t common 
yet. The connection between weapons and money was rather weakly per-
ceived. The grandest ideas concerned Estonia’s own air force and contem-
porary air defence. We had to learn everything, even how to give up on 
some things.
2. False expectations
After the independence of Estonia was restored, it may have looked like 
our country had a number of cheap armament options, incl. the resources 
of the Soviet army in Estonia, but also in Latvia and Lithuania – the for-
mer Soviet republics further away did receive a big share of them; the 
quick aid with arms we expected to receive from the West as well as the 
establishment of a domestic military industry. In reality, we received 
almost nothing.
All that the Russian army left behind were some old gas masks, hel-
mets, oil and lubricants, and a vast number of buildings that were too 
difficult to maintain. Even these leftovers weren’t counted before autumn 
1994, and they became a burden instead of helping us in any way.
Only some items from the Soviet militia and a very small number of 
random arms, cartridges, hand grenades and signal flares made it into the 
ownership of the Defence Forces. They were of no help in actually arming 
the Defence Forces. The 45-mm obsolete salute cannon was used a couple 
of times when there were guests approaching from the sea. 
Connections with the military industry of Russia were even a pos-
sibility. However, the manufacturers were offering their goods with the 
delivery term of ex works, i.e. they had to be picked up from the factory. 
Tula, for example, was unfortunately both politically and geographically 
further away from Estonia than Shanghai or Haifa. Dealing with the Ros-
vooruzheniye that ruled the vast expanses between Tula and Estonia was 
out of the question.
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Private weapons in Estonia and via Estonia were also not a solution. 
After exiting the former social order, Estonia gradually entered another 
world, that of the West, and this also concerned controlling the arms trade 
on its borders. Estonia had not joined many important treaties yet and a 
number of domestic legislative acts and institutions still had to be created. 
Many smaller dealers and fortune seekers noticed the arms trade vacuum 
on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea from 1992–1994 and they regarded 
Estonia as a corridor between the arms trade of the East and the West.
Privately initiated illegal and unlawful arms trade in our region can 
be divided into three parts on the basis of the goods and those who trans-
ported them: attempts to move goods of Russian origin to the West via 
Estonia during the short winter period of 1991 and 1992, and the uncon-
trolled movement of European arms to Estonia and through Estonia in 
two separate stages – from 1993 to spring 1994 and thereafter from 1994 
to summer 1995. The state had managed to create order in the area by 
1995 and this kind of business fizzled out with the exception of a cou-
ple of later triers. This activity could not be combined with the goals of 
national defence.
Tens of thousands of registered weapons were in civil circulation in 
Estonia at the time when independence was restored, but the majority of 
them were smoothbore shotguns used for hunting that were of no use for 
the Defence Forces. Museum pieces and deactivated arms used for mili-
tary training in schools didn’t make much of a difference either.
Thousands of firearms, especially handguns and revolvers, and mil-
lions of cartridges were brought to Estonia at the height of the legal import 
of civil arms in 1994. The interest in private weapons started to decrease 
in 1995 and the number of people wanting to buy them was significantly 
smaller in the subsequent years. None of this met the requirements of 
national defence either.
The domestic defence industry was just starting to develop. Targeted 
work by the companies Eli and Englo in the relevant sector started in the 
period of 1996–1998 and E-Arsenal increased its production volumes by 
1999–2000. However, no military weapons are made in Estonia to this day.
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The defence cooperation between the Baltic States also developed 
much later. The Baltic States Peacekeeping Battalion was launched in 
1995, and it didn’t need any aid with arms from the West at first. The 
Baltic Naval Squadron BALTRON, the Baltic Airspace Surveillance Proj-
ect BALTNET and the Baltic Defence College were established only in 
1998–1999.
3. Weaponless assistance of the West 1993–1996
boots – coats – cars – vessels – aircraft
The Baltic States received considerable aid from the West from 1993–1995, 
Estonia from Germany, the US, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland 
and France in particular. But this aid was weaponless and only included 
innocent, usually old and used items such as the personal equipment of 
soldiers, cars and equipment for barracks and kitchens. The first ship-
ment of quality boots and older Willys-type jeeps to the Defence Forces 
of Estonia arrived from France in the winter of 1992/1993. Germany 
started sending the personal equipment of the soldiers of the former East 
Germany in spring 1993 and the US bases in Europe also sent uniforms. 
There were also tents, old radio equipment and field telephones from 
different countries. A big aid shipment from Sweden arrived in October 
1993: several thousands of uniforms and helmets, bicycles, trucks, field 
kitchens and 13 weaponless armoured vehicles (the 1942 model).
The Defence Forces started with a very modest car fleet in 1992, which 
consisted of a couple of Soviet motor cars and trucks, but the West helped 
us with this from the very beginning. The Defence Forces received 600 
cars in aid from 1993–1996 and the first of them were 200 East  German 
trucks IFA and Robur. The second third was the aid granted by the US 
from 1995–1996, mainly in the shape of Chevrolet military vehicles, and 
the remainder came from Denmark, Switzerland and elsewhere.
The Navy was created a little later. The first usable warship was the 
190-ton Mallemukken, renamed Ahti, which was a gift from the Danes 
204 Toe Nõmm
in spring 1994. The two 400 Kondor-type minesweepers, two L-410 air-
craft and some Mi-type helicopters came from the stocks of East Ger-
many from 1993–1994. The aircraft equipment went to the Border Guard 
Aviation Corps. The vessels received from Finland from 1992–1995 were 
particularly important in the Establishment of the Estonian border guard 
fleet.
East German (GDr) equipment – aid from a lost world
The most important thing for the West in the beginning of the 1990s was 
to reduce the critically dangerous military tension in the world and in 
Europe as a whole. One of the main initiatives for reducing the threat of 
war was launched in 1991 – spreading the vast quantities of troops and 
arms piled up in Central Europe to the peripheral regions. The Warsaw 
Pact was also liquidated and the Russian army started its great return 
home from Eastern Europe, with its weapons, which lasted until autumn 
1994. In the opposite direction, the US withdrew some of its units from 
West Germany. This led to the birth of a special flea market of arms in 
1991 – the reunified Germany started giving away and selling the mas-
sive estate of one of the main creators of tension in Central Europe – the 
NVA, i.e. the army of the former German Democratic Republic, which 
consisted of over 10,000 various armoured vehicles, 5,000 artillery pieces, 
700 aircraft and helicopters, and 300,000 tons of munition. 44 countries 
of the world, including Estonia, had signed up for the East German assets 
by November 1991.
Most of the NVA’s equipment was sold and distributed from 1991–
1994 to tens of countries for the total price of just 1 billion dollars. The 
quantities of arms acquired by Greece and Turkey were particularly big: 
hundreds of thousands of automatic rifles, thousands of antitank weapons 
and hundreds of armoured vehicles. Finland bought a number of tanks, 
guns and automatic rifles for a very good price whilst Sweden opted for 
several hundred armoured vehicles. Hungary received tanks, Poland 
MiG-29 fighter aircraft, Indonesia tens of warships, etc. The prices for 
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which East German arms were sold were very buyer friendly: for exam-
ple, a good Kalashnikov automatic rifle cost 40 dollars, which was three 
times cheaper than the rifles Estonia bought from China. The difference 
with Western prices was even bigger. Hundreds of 23-mm anti-aircraft 
cannons of the same type, like the ones Estonia bought from Israel, were 
also sold cheaply.
But what about the poorer relatives? Like us? There was something for 
us too. A more or less similar gift package was allocated to all three Baltic 
States from 1993–1994: each of them got a couple of L-410 aircraft and 
some helicopters and ships, a couple of hundred trucks and piles of coats, 
boots and uniforms from the East German army. There was a difference, 
though – all of this aid was embarrassingly devoid of any weapons. 
Estonian Defence Minister Hain Rebas (on the left) and Chief of Staff  
of the Estonian Defence Forces Colonel Ants Laaneots supervising the 
demonstration of Israeli weapons on Aegviidu training range (22th of May 
1993). Lembit Michelson/ETA/Estonian Film Archives
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Non-armament of the baltic states
The aid given in the first years was diverse but included no weapons. 
What was the matter? There is no reason to believe that Tallinn, Riga and 
Vilnius all just forgot to request them and offering them to us just didn’t 
occur to the West. In the maelstrom of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the 
changes occurring in Europe, there was one extremely important task: to 
prevent the outbreak of a major war. And this was achieved with a kind 
of cooperation and compromises between the West and the East that an 
entire generation had never witnessed. There was no way that listening 
to the local concerns of the eastern edge of the Baltic Sea could com-
pete with this, especially since the Russian army was still here. One day, 
the time will be right for analysing the political background of the non-
armament of Estonia and the Baltic States in the beginning of the 1990s.
It soon became evident that there are no such things as free lunches, 
i.e. there would be no cheap and quick aid with weapons. Finding options 
for purchasing arms and ammunition, for the full price of course, became 
the most important task of national defence.
The history of Estonian weapons procurements can be divided into 
periods of relatively equal lengths according to the manner and results of 
the procurement:
1st period of 1992–1996 – five years of rushed active self-armament 
using our own money, as there was almost no aid with arms from 
abroad;
2nd period of 1997–2002 – the passive period when not much was 
contributed to armament by the state; however, it was the peak 
time of free aid with arms and the advancement of the domestic 
defence industry;
3rd period from 2002/2003 until the global recession – another active 
period with major purchases of arms.
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4. 1st period of armament from 1992–1996:  
using our own money
The 1st period of armament in Estonia was characterised by the lack of 
free or affordable foreign aid with arms. Everything had to be procured 
with the state’s own money in a situation where the number of actual 
options was very limited. 
The first purchase of arms by Estonia after a 52-year interval was the 
procurement of a larger batch of Romanian AK automatic rifles. The arms 
arrived in the beginning of autumn 1992 and were immediately taken 
into use. The price of these rifles corresponded to their quality.
The number of orders for arms placed by Estonia peaked in the 
beginning of the subsequent winter. Six contracts for purchasing arms 
and ammunition from China and Israel were signed within five weeks 
from December 1992 to January 1993. Another four larger contracts were 
Estonian soldier armed with an Israeli Galil assault rifle in Iraq (2005). 
Author’s private collection
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signed later in the same period, three of them with Chinese companies 
and the last one with a Bulgarian company at the end of 1996 for pur-
chasing 120-mm mortars and related equipment. Many smaller procure-
ments, in particular for cartridges, were also organised at the same time. 
It would be interesting to find out whether anyone else other than China 
and Israel could have offered such a broad selection to Estonia in 1992 
and 1993? It certainly wasn’t the Republic of South Africa, especially con-
sidering the UN arms embargo.
It has become customary for people to roll around in tar and feath-
ers when the purchase of weapons from Israel is discussed to make sure 
that nobody looks more stupid than an Estonian. Maybe we should take 
a different look at this for a change. Estonia broke through to the West 
in terms of armament with the well-known purchase of weapons from 
the Israeli company IMI-TAAS. The actions that led to this procurement 
of weapons lasted longer and involved more people than is usually men-
tioned. However, the most intense and volatile final stage of the contract 
preparations took place only in the last couple of months of 1992. The 
contract was signed on the 7th of January 1993.
In December 1992, before the contract was signed, the total price of 
the goods to be purchased was dropped significantly to 49 million dol-
lars, Estonia was named as the place of destination of the goods and the 
first instalment payable under the contract was reduced three times. As 
we found out later, finding these 5 million dollars was also a struggle for 
Estonia at the time. At first, all of the goods were expected to arrive faster, 
incl. by charter flights, and payments were supposed to be made imme-
diately upon the arrival of the goods, i.e. in 1 to 1.5 years. The arrival of 
goods and payment for them were later split into two separate sched-
ules. The goods were supposed to be sent in three years (1993–1995) 
whilst the majority of instalments were to be made in the subsequent 
five years (1996–2000). It seems that in the interests of these changes, 
Estonia had to sacrifice a piece of its security in terms of time, i.e. the 
speed at which the weapons were delivered. However, this could have 
been the first security policy decision whose benefits could be measured 
in money.
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In retrospect, the amended conditions may be regarded as useful 
foresight. The rapid growth of the state budget and improvement of other 
financial indicators (ca four times from 1993–2000) made later payment 
easier for Estonia despite the interest (11.4 million dollars or 23% of the 
value of the goods) that had to be paid from the fourth to the eighth year 
of the contract. Perhaps that wasn’t too much for such a long payment 
term and Estonia’s international trustworthiness in 1992.
The unit prices of items had been presented in November, but when 
the total cost was reduced en gros in December 1992, they were not recal-
culated or entered into the contract. There was no time. This is why the 
received goods were registered at their earlier prices in Estonia and the 
calculated totals tended to be different. Most of the agreed-upon equip-
ment arrived on time. Approximately 80% of the goods had been delivered 
Estonian air defence troops with a Soviet towed 23 mm anti-aircraft  
twin-barrelled automatic cannon Sergey ZU-23-2 in a German Magirus  
truck trailer. Estonian bought these anti-aircraft autocannons from Israeli 
company IMI-TAAS (1997). Rauno Volmar/Estonian Defence Forces
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by September 1995, but Estonia still hadn’t paid 70% of the contracted 
price. The second, i.e. the correct batch of 23 mm antiaircraft cannons 
and the majority of the MAPATS antitank system were late, arriving only 
in 1996 and 1997. Part of the equipment was checked during the last three 
years of the contract and some little things were taken care of, such as 
the replacement of bayonet scabbards and obtaining a number of extra 
magazines for automatic rifles.
The story of the 23-mm antiaircraft cannons is the backbone of the 
ongoing whinging that surrounds the TAAS procurement. The quantity 
of Russian-type 23 mm cannons specified in the contract arrived in Tal-
linn at the agreed time in the beginning of 1994. However, it was imme-
diately obvious that the goods were not new or in good order. This gave 
birth to the ‘overpaid scrap metal’ claims, which would even deserve 
some attention if the Estonians had ordered such cannons or put up with 
them or paid anything for them, or if a brand new batch of the same arms 
had not been received later.
The second or the correct batch of fully functional new 23 mm can-
nons, which cost less than 8% of the total price of the purchased goods, 
arrived in Tallinn in 1996. These cannons had been made for Estonia on 
the order of TAAS in the factory where they were manufactured. The rea-
son why 23 mm cannons were the only antiaircraft weapons purchased 
is a simple one: Estonia could afford them. Larger sets of even light anti-
aircraft missile systems cost about as much as the entire transaction with 
Israel and remained too expensive for Estonia for a long time to come. 
Also, control over the spread of surface-to-air missiles is stricter than 
average and our opinion of ourselves at the time may not have coincided 
with the way Estonia was regarded by others.
Some additional statements have also kept the mantra of the ‘notori-
ous arms deal’ alive. For example, the concern that the purchased goods 
were all made for the desert and completely unsuitable for our puddles 
and snow piles. Most of these concerns are completely unfounded. How-
ever, it would probably possible to find a few smaller problems that are 
more truthful but have never been mentioned. The procurement was 
large, complicated and rushed, so it’s unlikely that no mistakes were made 
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somewhere along the line. Additional spares and devices would have 
obviously been ordered separately as necessary. Unfortunately, the public 
atmosphere around the procurement turned toxic and the fact that the 
result of the contract was later never proceed to finish up, did, at the very 
least, cause a threat of political suicide.
Chinese weapons were cheap, but Europe or the customs service at 
Rotterdam didn’t like them. The more time passed, the less they liked 
them. Estonia managed to receive most of the goods it had ordered. How-
ever, this squabbling couldn’t go on forever and Estonia’s arms trade with 
China fizzled out. The last batch of weapons from China arrived in spring 
1996 and the very last shipment with simple pyrotechnics arrived in Tal-
linn in 2001. Several purchases of cartridges from China were also made 
in-between. However, the weapons purchased from Israel and other 
countries arrived without any problems. 
Regarding Finland, there were some significant similarities with the 
start of the War of Independence in 1918, but in a different way – back 
Estonian reservists during an excercise is an US military Jeep Willys-Overland 
M38A1, which was in production 1952–1971 (1998). Estonian Defence Forces
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then we quickly received ‘fish’ in the form of weapons and men from our 
neighbours, but this time they gave us ‘rather a rod than fish’.
The defence budget comprised ca 4–5% of Estonia’s state budget from 
1993–2000. The share of the payments made under the Israeli contract in 
the budget decreased year on year, from the initial one-third to one-tenth 
by the end of the period. This means that the increase in the state’s rev-
enue and budget was clearly ahead of the payment schedule of the con-
tract. The part of the defence budget allocated to purchases of weapons 
was planned for the coming years in such a manner that the state would 
be able to pay all the payments due under the Israeli contract and ca one-
tenth was added for so-say additional armament expenses, i.e. ca 0.5–1.5 
million dollars per year. This wasn’t enough for even small developments 
and training. The large quantities of ammunition previously procured 
from Israel and China helped here. Most of the defence budget has always 
been spent on people (wages, uniforms, barracks, etc.).
Lessons avoided
It is difficult to say what the proportion between smart foresight and luck 
was in 1992 and 1993, but Estonia missed out on some lessons in arma-
ment. The IMI contract was a substantive sign of a so-called unharnessing 
and helped avoid the integration of dealers with the state, locking most 
of the money. The cheap equipment from China was a suitable addition 
to what the country couldn’t or wasn’t able to buy from the West and also 
familiar to those who had served in the Soviet army. Estonia would have 
probably tried to purchase arms elsewhere if these first procurements had 
failed. But would these deals have been equally reliable, and how much 
would the weapons have cost? Estonia’s actual armament capacity at the 
time was smaller than is often suggested.
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5. 2nd period of armament – free aid
The armament policy of Estonia was changed cardinally in 1997. The only 
way to obtain any weapons over the last five years was to buy them for 
your own money, but there were no major purchases of arms in the long 
period that followed, and it was fully dominated by free military aid from 
the West.
The transition period started in 1996 when Western countries sent 
some small weapons to BALTBAT. But the actual breakthrough occurred 
in 1997 when M16 automatic rifles from the US and the first 105-mm 
howitzers and ammunition from Finland arrived in Tallinn. MG3 
machine guns from Germany and a large quantity of engineering sup-
port equipment were received from Switzerland and Denmark in 1998, 
followed by M14 rifles from the US and 81-mm mortars from Norway 
in 1999. From 1997–2000 Estonia received Frauenlob- and Lindau-type 
minesweepers, Iltis-jeeps and signal guns from Germany, Unimog trucks 
from Switzerland and precision rifles from France.
The period from 1999–2002 was dominated by large-scale military 
aid from Sweden, which included automatic rifles, machine guns, grenade 
launchers, mortars, their ammunition and other similar equipment. The 
monetary value of the military aid from the Sweden would have increased 
the cost of the Israeli contract even if calculated at residual value.
The new weapons purchased by Estonia with its own money dur-
ing this period could be counted on fingers. However, more cartridges 
and other munition were often procured in smaller batches. The circle 
of the countries who had sold cartridges and other munition to Estonia 
expanded rapidly from 1997: the Check Republic, Bulgaria, Austria and 
others were also added to the list. Estonian companies also intermediated 
smaller quantities of cartridges and sporting weapons.
The state also tried to actively develop its own defence industry in 
the 2nd period. Large quantities of training pyrotechnics were made in 
E-Arsenal from 1999–2005 – blank cartridges reloaded into spent cases 
of cartridges, training grenade fuses, smoke equipment and blasting 
devices. It’s true that the attempts to make domestic production profitable 
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and competitive, or more modern and complex, failed despite the efforts 
of the authorities. Achieving valuable production without the existence of 
a civil market would have required a special financing policy.
The 3rd period of armament started in 2002/2003 with major pur-
chases of weapons and was once again different from the other periods. 
Armament for ca 20 million dollars was ordered in the end of 2002 and 
the beginning of 2003.
Summary
Estonia bought weapons for ca 60 million dollars (weapons and acces-
sories, ammunition, hand grenades, explosives, etc.) in the first decade 
of independent armament. 49 million of this amount was spent on the 
goods purchased with the Israeli contract (plus 11.4 million in interest), 
and other procurements of weapons cost ca 10 million dollars. In the third 
place is the single procurement from Chinese company China Jing An in 
1994, followed by several smaller procurements of Chinese goods from 
1992–1995, each of them costing around half a million dollars.
Some of the goods agreed to at the end of 1992 and the beginning 
of 1993 (Chinese automatic rifles and cartridges, and samples of weap-
ons from Israel) arrived in the first half of 1993. A strong breakthrough 
in armament occurred in December 1993/January 1994. First of all, the 
Defence Forces received the first larger quantity of Chinese antitank 
weapons and their rounds. Secondly, the first larger quantity of Israeli 
equipment arrived – many automatic rifles, all mortars, radio equipment, 
harnesses and body armour for soldiers, large quantities of ammo, etc. 
Six months were left until the departure of the Russian army. Another 
larger shipment from China with antitank weapons and rounds and hand 
grenades arrived from China in summer 1994. The Defence Forces and 
the Defence League became a considerable military force on the first half 
of 1994. They had the ability to arm ca 10,000 men with millions of car-
tridges, tens of thousands of hand grenades, antitank rounds and mortar 
bombs, and hundreds of sets of radio equipment.
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Several tens of millions of various cartridges, ca 100,000 units of mor-
tar bombs and antitank mines, hand grenades, etc. were purchased in the 
1990s, mostly from Israel and China, which weighed ca one thousand 
tons in total. In comparison – after the War of Independence in 1920, 
Estonia had nearly 10,000 tons of such items (cartridges, mines, shells, 
explosives, etc.), i.e. considerably more. In some categories of goods pur-
chased from Israel and China, ammunition ended up costing consider-
ably more than the weapons themselves: for example, the price of 81-mm 
mortar bombs exceeded the price of the relevant weapons multiple times. 
The ammunition procured in the 1990s were enough for stock and train-
ing until the middle of the 2000s, sometimes even for longer.
The price indexes of consumer goods don’t have much to do with the 
arms trade, as the latter is influenced by different things. The prices of 
cartridges didn’t change much in the 1990s and even the cost of NATO’s 
new, 5.56-mm automatic rifle cartridge remained pretty much the same, 
whether they came from Israel or any other Western manufacturer offer-
ing the average price. The rapid price increase of cartridges started in the 
2000s as a result of the steep increase in the prices of copper and lead.
In addition to weapons, more than 100,000 metres of camouflage uni-
form fabric costing 1.7 or 2.7 dollars per metre, boots costing 25 dollars 
a pair and other items required for military services were procured from 
China from 1993–1995.
The ordered goods can be interpreted as aid in two ways, depending 
on needs and options: it’s either free or arrives very quickly and can be 
paid for afterwards. Time or the speed of deliveries was the most impor-
tant criterion in the weapons procurements organised immediately after 
independence was regained. The main part of the decisive foreign aid 
in the War of Independence (1918–1920) arrived during the first seven 
months of the war. Both now and back in 1918/1919, weapons were only 
available for more or less the full price and the possibility to pay in instal-
ments was the biggest bonus.
In terms of speed, quantity and diversity, the results of Estonia’s arma-
ment in the first years were unique. The state also managed to carry out 
all of its plans without any serious failures. The latter is also remarkable 
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considering the limited experience of Estonians at the time. This took 
place earlier than most other important defence policy developments in 
Estonia.
It’s easy to be clever in hindsight – look, it was nothing. Unfortunately, 
the nations who have thought like that have disappeared along the way.
